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Abstract
This paper compares contingent values for a hypothetical landscape protection
programme with respondents’ voting behaviour in an actual referendum. We use the
example of a proposed increase of expenditures for landscape protection in the canton
of Zurich, Switzerland. In particular we examine (i) CVM bid magnitudes of the
different voter groups, (ii) relationships between qualitative response categories, (iii)
consistency of responses assuming tax increases are known, and (iv) associations with
socio-economic characteristics. Results suggest a strong upward bias of hypothetical
values, possibly indicating that many respondents failed to realistically consider their
budget constraints in the hypothetical choice situation.
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Introduction
Economists usually determine the welfare benefits to society from a proposed project by
estimating changes in consumer surplus measured from market demand functions. However,
when public goods and particularly passive use values of such goods are involved, market
demand functions are not available. Economists can then try to set up hypothetical markets, in
which individuals are asked to state their maximum willingness to pay for a proposed project.
The question of whether hypothetical willingness to pay is a valid measure of actual
willingness to pay has been approached from the perspective of both internal and external
validity tests. Internal validity tests examine if stated values are consistent with the basic
assumptions of the Hicksian model of consumer preferences. However, internal consistency
cannot rule out systematic disparities between hypothetical and actual behaviour, nor must
human behaviour always be consistent with the Hicksian model. Therefore, whenever
possible, external validity tests remain a preferred means for validation.
External validity tests, also called tests of  “criterion validity”, of stated willingness to
pay for public goods are comparatively scarce. The small literature reflects the difficulty in
finding equivalent situations for hypothetical and actual choices. With public goods that have
no adequate private substitutes and important passive-use values, the market based indirect
valuation methods fail as external tests of validity. The main operational approach has been to
carry out experiments to measure the relationship between hypothetical versus real payments
using private goods (Bishop and Heberlein, 1979; Cummings et al., 1995; Loomis et al.,
1996; Frykblom, 1997; Fox et al., 1998). An alternative approach has been to compare actual
with hypothetical payments in donation-type contexts (Seip and Strand, 1992; Duffield and
Patterson, 1992; Champ et al., 1994; Brown et al., 1996; Foster et al., 1997; Ethier et al.,
2000; MacMillan et al., 2000; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001). However, hypothetical bias3
may differ between private and public goods choices (Fox et al., 1998), whilst tests using
voluntary contribution mechanisms are subject to free riding in both actual and hypothetical
behaviour (Ethier et al., 2000).
An alternative source of information about the reliability of stated choices is the
comparison with actual choices in the political domain. Voting behaviour in referenda has
long been used to characterise preferences for public goods (e.g., Deacon and Shapiro, 1975;
Rubinfeld, 1977). To our knowledge, however, only one study has used information on voter
behaviour in the context of applied valuation. Shabman and Stevenson (1996) present
numbers of CVM respondents, who also participated in a local referendum on the same issue,
however do not report how they voted. Thus no systematic attempt to compare stated values
with actual voting behavior currently exists in the literature. This article provides the first
such comparisons of contingent valuation responses with the same individuals’ actual voting
behaviour in closely related (although not identical) propositions.
Hypothetical and actual voting behaviour are compared here in four ways. We
examine (1) median and mean stated WTP of approving and disapproving voter groups, (2)
frequencies of and relationships between qualitative response categories in the two choice
situations, (3) external consistency of the actual voting choices with CVM responses,
assuming that individuals knew expected tax increase due to the real referendum, and (4)
socio-economic characteristics explaining both hypothetical and actual choice behavior and
whether they were consistent.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. The next section identifies
conceptual issues in setting up the hypothetical and actual voting choices. A third section
describes the survey and voting procedures. The fourth section presents the results. A final
section offers a summary and conclusions.4
Conceptual issues
At first glance the procedure of comparing contingent values with real political choices is
straightforward. Valuation surveys can easily be formulated in the desired comparable format,
i.e., as referenda, and the ‘payment vehicle’ can be chosen to correspond with that in a real
referendum, as a change in tax payments. For several reasons, including claims of incentive-
compatibility and similarity to habitual choice situations, the NOAA panel on contingent
valuation considered the referendum format combined with a voting context as the most
desirable design for contingent valuation (Arrow et al., 1993). There appear to be two main
issues to consider in setting up pairs of hypothetical and real referenda.
(1) Only referenda which involve alternative levels of public good expenditures may
be useful for comparison. In other referenda on public goods issues a substantial portion of
the costs may arise not in the form of a change in the tax burden but as, for example, lost
production and employment opportunities with unknown costs to the individual.
(2) Asking identical hypothetical (CVM) questions at the same time as a real
referendum is not an option. Not only is the information available to the respondent then
different from that in a typical CVM survey context, but it may also be fundamentally
impossible to put respondents in the mindset of a hypothetical choice when they are making a
real choice.
The most relevant comparison would seem to be to carry out a CVM study on an issue
before an actual referendum occurs. It is also important to think about how best to get
respondents to subsequently truthfully reveal how they voted in the actual referendum, to
avoid a “compliance bias” in the sense that respondents may not accurately report their un-
disclosed voting decision after the ballot. It is also necessary to have some way of sampling
the same set of respondents for both tests of preference (CVM and actual referendum). The5
data analyzed in this paper were obtained from a CVM survey and referendum pair, which
combines some of these desired features. Data were obtained in a CVM survey conducted
three months before the referendum, from official voter records, and from a survey of voting
behaviour that was sent out after the referendum had occurred to the original CVM
respondent sample. The procedures involved in obtaining these data sets are presented in turn
in the following section.
Survey and voting procedures
Contingent valuation survey
The objective of the contingent valuation survey was to establish the magnitude and
determinants of individual willingness to pay for improved protection of the cultivated
landscape pattern in the Weinland region of the canton of Zurich, Switzerland (Roschewitz,
1999). In co-operation with a socio-economic research institute (LINK International,
Research and Consulting, Lucerne) a telephone survey was conducted, in which 816 potential
voters living in the Weinland region itself and in the neighbouring city of Winterthur were
surveyed. To obtain a respondent sample that corresponds well with the structure of the
sampled population the target persons for interviewing were drawn in a two-stage process. At
the outset random samples were drawn based on the Swisscom electronic list of phone lines in
the two survey areas. To convert the resulting household sample into a sample of individual
respondents, the household structure was surveyed at the beginning of the interview, yielding
number, age and gender of all target persons in the household. A random sample was then
drawn from all target persons of the households. Half of the households reporting one target
person were used for an interview. For the other half of these households, the interview was6
terminated after recording household structure. For households with two target persons, only
one person was asked for an interview. In three-person households an interview was held with
one or two persons. Households were contacted five times before target respondents were
replaced. A computer-assisted algorithm for the replacements ensured that the age, sex, and
geographic distribution of the samples remained close to census distributions. A detailed
description of the sources of loss at household and individual levels, of the replacement
algorithm, and of the resulting sample distributions is given in Roschewitz (1999). A
summary of the sample losses and resulting respondent numbers is shown in Table 2.
Following a short general explanation, the interviews consisted of three parts. In the
first part, respondents were asked various questions about their knowledge of the Weinland
region, their outdoor activities, attitudes, and the subjective importance of improving certain
aspects of the landscape such as restoring more natural lakeshores or reducing disturbance
from traffic.
In the second part, the interviewers stated that for the following it was important to be
clear what exactly is understood by the “landscape”. A definition was given as follows:
“The landscape is the habitat of people, animals and plants. It is composed of meadows, arable fields, forest,
hedgerows, vineyards, and waters with their shores. These areas are being used for agriculture and forestry, for
recreation and leisure activities and for nature protection. Depending on use, these areas are more or less
natural”.
A subsequent question asked respondents to rate the quality of the Weinland landscape on a
scale from 1 to 6 (with a don’t know option). Before the actual valuation question,
respondents were reminded that protection or improvement of the landscape was costly, and
that every person already payed on average 50 SFR (30 $) in taxes for agricultural support
measures each month. The landscape protection programme was then described as follows:
“The municipalities of the Zurich Weinland could develop a programme for protecting the landscape of the
Zurich Weinland. This protection programme would mean that the current state of the landscape is preserved.”7
On request, the following additional information about the protection was given:
“1. The composition of meadows, fields, forest, vineyards, and waters with their shores does not change. 2.
Near-natural areas such as flower meadows, hedgerows and natural areas such as fens are preserved. 3. The
use and management of these areas remains the same.”
Then, the respondent was asked:
“Imagine that on the next weekend there was a vote on this programme to protect the landscape of the Zurich
Weinland. If the proposition were accepted, you would have to expect a maximal tax increase of … Francs per
month. How would you vote?”
Options for answering were “yes” and “no”, and “no answer”. Following a triple bounded
referendum procedure, the question was repeated inserting adjusted tax payments taken from
one of two search trees (“And how would you vote if you would have to pay… Francs per
month?”). Two search trees were used to establish whether there was a starting-point bias.
Finally, the interviewer added a follow-up question:
“In other words, you agree to pay up to about … Francs annually in additional taxes for the protection of the
Zurich Weinland. If this sum now appears too high or too low, would you like to correct it?”
If the answer was “yes” the respondent could then adjust the figure. In the following results
section mean WTP is calculated from these final figures of the triple-bounded referendum
with follow-up. Those respondents who stated a zero WTP were asked the reasons for this
response, in order to distinguish protest responses from true zero responses. Zero-bidding
respondents were allocated to the following six categories.
(1) “The landscape is not worth anything to me”; (2) “I already pay enough taxes. The money would just have
to be better used for the landscape”; (3) “I cannot afford additional expenses”; (4) “I need more information
about the programme”; (5) “one cannot value the landscape in Francs and Centimes”; (6)  “this referendum is
completely unrealistic”.8
In the following results, when one or more of reasons (4), (5), or (6) were agreed on, zero
responses were interpreted as protests.
In a third section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked about membership in
environmental groups, annual donations to environmental causes, and socio-economic
characteristics including age, number of children, degree of occupation, education, profession,
rural vs. urban background, years at current residential location, and income group.
The Referendum
The amendment to the canton of Zurich’s “act on measures for nature and heritage protection
and for recreation areas” was submitted to the voters (and adopted with 57 % approval) in
September 1996 (Office of the Parliament, 1996). The proposition envisaged increasing
annual instalments into the public (cantonal) fund for nature and heritage protection by SFR
10 million from SFR 10-20 million to a new SFR 20-30 million. Further, the amendment
empowered the parliament to decide on an additional yearly instalment of SFR 10 million into
the fund to pay off debts. The changes to the act were justified by “increasing expenditures
for the maintenance, restoration and management of the objects of nature and heritage
protection”, and by the inflation since the fund was established in 1974. The use of the fund’s
money was described in the voter information journal as: “From the fund for nature and
heritage protection the canton finances measures for creating, maintaining, enabling access to,
improving or managing landscapes, townscapes, natural and cultural objects, and recreation
areas worth of protection.“ (Executive Council, 1996). With 82 votes in favour and 74
against, the cantonal parliament recommended adopting the proposition. In 1996 about half of
the means were allocated to nature and landscape protection and management (primarily cost-
sharing payments to land owners for managing old growth orchards, marginal species-rich9
grassland and fen meadows). The remainder went to the support of restoring historical
buildings, and maintaining parks and archeological sites (Canton of Zurich, 1997a).
Voter survey
The survey on voter behaviour was conducted in co-operation with the socio-economic
research institute LINK International, Research and Consulting, Lucerne. A questionnaire on
voting behaviour was mailed to all 816 CVM respondents’ addresses in April 2001. Among
these addresses there were 157 CVM respondents who had moved and whose new address
was not readily available; 16 had deceased. Potential respondents, who had not returned the
completed questionnaire after four weeks, were reminded by telephone. When asked on the
phone a considerable additional portion of the sample agreed to participate. Those who had
already disposed of the questionnaire received a replacement by mail immediately. Finally, 67
individuals who declined to fill out the questionnaire even on repeated request were willing to
answer the questions directly on the phone. These answers were recorded but may be less
reliable. However, only 29 of these 67 responses made it into the sample of 176 valid
responses on voter behaviour. Due to exclusion of income non-responses and protest zero
bids, only 16 of these are among the 123 observations used in the regression analysis. Eighty-
two respondents could not be reached by phone. (For a summary of sample sizes see Table 2).
In an accompanying letter the respondents were reminded of their participation in a
contingent valuation survey of the Weinland landscape in 1996. They were informed of this
subsequent research project, for which it was important to obtain information on how those
interviewed in 1996 voted on issues related to the Weinland landscape
1. Respondents were
then asked to answer a questionnaire with ten multiple-choice questions.
                                               
1 Actual votes cast cannot be retrieved directly from the voting records due to votes being confidential.10
The questionnaire listed dates, issues, voting recommendations of parties and large
interest groups, and voting outcomes of four referenda from the period 1995 to 1999,
including the 1996 vote on nature and heritage funding (see questionnnaire structure in the
Appendix). For each voting issue a copy of the summary page from the government’s official
voter journal was included with the questionnaire. Question 1 asked: “How did you vote on
these issues?” For each voting issue the options “yes”, “no” and “did not vote” were given.
Question 2 stated: “Considerable time has passed since these referenda were held. How
certain are you of your answer given in question 1?” Here choice options were “certain”,
“quite certain” and “uncertain”. To be able to establish whether questionnaires had been
completed by the addressees themselves the questionnaire included two control questions on
top. All questionnaires were marked with a code for the 1996 interview respondent number,
as well as for age and gender, for easy comparison with answers to control questions.
Similarities and differences between propositions
Basic characteristics of the CVM/referendum pair are listed in Table 1. Apart from the more
technical features given in the Table similarities of the propositions include the focus on
protection of the presently existing landscape elements and patterns rather than creation of
new ones, a proposed change (increase) of already substantial public expenditures, and an
infinite time horizon of the project.
The most important difference regards the amount of detail regarding involved
institutions and procedures potentially available to the interested voter/respondent.
Instruments of protection through the nature and heritage fund such as voluntary land
management contracts between farmers and the cantonal government are well established and
potentially known about by a wide group of people. The presentation of the related11
referendum issue was presented in about 1500 words and illustrated with two pictures in the
voter information journal. The CVM survey in contrast formulated the protection programme
very coarsely in terms of its landscape protection effect, leaving the involved institutions and
procedures largely unspecified. Further, the real proposition included the protection of
traditional townscapes, such as by providing subsidies to cultural heritage owners for costly
restoration work. The hypothetical voting proposition did not encompass the protection of this
architectural heritage, although it is reasonable to assume that many CVM respondents
viewed the maintenance of the traditional rural architecture of the region as an integral part of
the proposal.
While some differences of the propositions thus existed, they may have been of minor
importance for individual decision-making in the face of proposed protection programmes.
Decisions about the quantity of complex public goods may be resolved into two parts, (1) a
decision about the relative priorities of various component services and (2) a decision as to
the amount of the overall level of the good (Bowen, 1943). In the case of Zurich landscape
protection, the extent rather than the priorities of protection have been a recurring subject of
controversy in political debates. In such cases the quantity of the good can be usefully
measured in terms of the amount of money expended. Therefore, any observed differences
between the hypothetical and actual landscape protection propositions at hand should indeed
reflect the different payment conditionality in actual vs. hypothetical choices. Based on the
usual assumption of stable preferences we tested the hypothesis that individuals’ WTP stated
in the CVM survey is equal to their actual WTP implicit in real referendum decisions.
The specific hypotheses tested are as follows:
(i) Median and mean stated WTP of approving and disapproving voter groups differ
significantly and in the expected ways;12
(ii) The frequency of the qualitative CVM response categories “WTP non-response”
and “protest zero bid” is equal in the different voter groups;
(iii) Actual voting choices are consistent with those predicted from CVM responses
and individuals’ expected tax increase in the real referendum; and
(iv) Socio-economic characteristics affect predicted and actual voting behavior in
identical ways.
Results
Swiss citizens are generally reluctant to give information about their political attitudes
2. Steps
taken to obtain maximal voter survey response included an accompanying letter emphasizing
that respondent addresses would be immediately separated from responses by LINK and that
the information would be used only for scientific purposes. The letter was printed on the
paper of the Swiss Federal Institute of Forest, Snow, and Landscape Research, which is
located near Zurich (affiliation of the second author), and was signed by the first two authors
and a representative of LINK. An overview of sample size over the survey process is shown
in Table 2. Given the rather low effective response rate (26-29%) we examined how the
distributions of independent variables in the sub-samples compare with those in the original
CVM samples. The upper portion of Table 3 lists respective means of the basic socio-
economic variables. The voter sub-sample featured a somewhat higher education level and
household income than the full sample of the CVM survey. The lower portion of Table 3 lists
respective means for qualitative and quantitative measures of CVM response. Mean WTP was
slightly higher in the voter sub-samples than in the complete CVM samples, but the
differences were not statistically significant. Changes in the percentage of WTP non-
                                               
2 Personal communication by Peter Grau of LINK Institute, Lucerne.13
responses, protest zero and true zero bids when moving from the CVM samples to the voter
sub-samples do not indicate systematic bias in the sub-sample.
The proposed regional landscape protection programme of the CVM survey has a
somewhat different scope for residents of the Weinland region and residents of the
neighboring city of Winterthur. For the region’s inhabitants the programme covers all of their
surrounding landscape. For the city residents on the other hand, the Weinland is but one (the
northern) of two important regions for short recreation trips. To the south of the city there is
an equally attractive and important region for short recreational trips. Moreover, the
surrounding area of the city itself also includes landscapes with some recreational value that
are not covered by the hypothetical Weinland protection programme. Thus the urban and the
rural samples are initially not pooled in the following comparison of CVM samples and voter
sub-samples. In spite of a difference of scope of the protection programme, mean WTP did
not differ significantly in the urban and rural samples. It should be noted, however, that this
observation alone does not imply scope insensitivity. The voting outcome presented below
suggests that a difference in scope of the project may have been compensated by a generally
higher demand for landscape protection of the urban population. However, the observation
justifies pooling the two samples where an increased sample size is required.
Relationships between qualitative response categories
There are 176 observations for which both CVM and voting information is available. Table 4
lists mean WTP values for the different voter groups. Compared with a recorded voting
outcome of 40 percent approval in the rural study area and 60 percent approval in the city,
approving voters are strongly over-represented in the voter survey, which yielded an outcome14
of 72 percent approval. Further, potential voters who did not vote were strongly under-
represented with only 15 percent, compared to 74 percent in the official voting records.
Within the sample at hand, WTP non-respondents were more likely to be disapproving
than approving voters (c
2 = 6.5). In line with expectations, zero bids were more frequent in
the disapproving than in the approving voter group (c
2 = 53.9) and mean WTP was higher in
the approving than in the disapproving voters (t=3.2). However, the mean of positive WTP
bids alone was not significantly different for approving and disapproving voters (t=0.39,
p=0.70) (Table 4). Abstaining voters were not numerous enough to apply statistical tests.
However, they appeared to be similar to disapproving voters in terms of their high WTP non-
response rate, and similar to approving voters in terms of a low zero-response rate in the
CVM survey. With respect to mean and median WTP the abstaining voters were intermediate
between the approving and disapproving voter groups. Finally, a remarkable five out of seven
WTP bids that had been classified as ‘protest zero’ bids based on auxiliary survey
information, turned out to be ‘true zero’ bids in terms of these respondents’ actual voting
behavior.
Consistency of choices based on expected tax increases
According to received public choice theory, an individual has a preferred level of public
expenditures (given a particular tax system) at the point where the marginal benefits of
increased public expenditure is equal to the marginal cost the individual bears in additional
tax payments (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 159). Following this rationale, an individual’s vote in the
present referendum depends on whether the expected benefit from a proposed public good
expenditure exceeds his or her costs (in tax payments). Empirical studies of voter behavior
based on such explicit decision models have yielded consistent results (e.g., Bergstrom et al.,15
1982). Given an individual’s tax price
3 and the cost of the proposed public expenditure, we
here interpret the expected tax increase as an implied lower bound (in the case of approval) or
upper bound (in the case of disapproval) to the individual’s WTP for the proposed public
good. This implied value may be examined for consistency with WTP stated in the CVM
survey. In other words, stated WTP, together with the individual’s expected tax increase, may
be used to predict the individual’s voting decision in the subsequent real referendum, which
can then be compared with the actual decision.
Tax prices are not immediately available for the respondents of the voter survey.
However, household incomes reported in the CVM survey allow to estimate voters’ expected
tax increase due to the proposed 10 million expansion of the NHP budget. Coarse estimates of
the expected tax increase of households were computed using the canton of Zurich’s income
tax schedule (Canton of Zurich, 1997b). For citizens of the canton of Zurich cantonal income
tax represents about one third of total income taxes. An individual’s income tax Ti was
calculated as
(1) Ti = F(Ii) r1996 ,
where Ii is the household income of individual i (as reported in the CVM survey), F(Ii) is the
‘basic income tax’ figure given by the tax schedule of the cantonal tax law (Canton of Zurich,
1997b), and r1996 is the ‘tax rate’, which was at 1.08 in 1996 (Office of the Parliament, 1993).
The individuals tax price (the additional amount an individual must pay when government
expenditures increase by one unit) is approximated by
(2) tpi = Ti/B
                                               
3 The tax price is the amount an individual must pay when government expenditures increase by one unit.16
B is the total cantonal budget expenditure. Individual i’s expected additional tax burden DTi
due to the additional annual 10 million expenditure DG is thus given by
(3) DTi = tpi DG .
4
Table 5 lists mean stated WTP for the landscape protection programme, mean
expected tax increase due to the actual referendum, and the number and percentage of
individuals displaying ‘consistent’ behaviour in terms of their stated and revealed implicit
WTP. Approving voter decisions were in all but very few cases consistent with stated figures
of WTP. Due to small expected tax increases (up to about 25 SFR), this is equivalent to
observing that there were only few very low CVM bids given by approving voters. In
contrast, the disapproving voter group’s average expected tax increase of about 10 SFR is
clearly at odds with the average WTP of SFR 330 for the CVM proposition. Moreover, it
suggests that also in the approving voter group, absolute figures of WTP should be regarded
with caution. Respondent characteristics explaining the consistency of hypothetical and actual
choices are presented below, together with a comparison of conditional models for actual and
hypothetical voting behavior.
                                               
4 The proposed 10 million SFR expenditure corresponded with 0.298 percent of the 1995 cantonal budget of
3359 million SFR. (Canton of Zurich, 2001). For instance, a household with a taxable income Ii of 10’000 SFR
per month had a ‘basic income tax’ figure F(Ii) of 8800 SFR. This figure, multiplied by 1.08 (the 1996 ‘tax
rate’), yields the household’s total cantonal income tax of 9504 SFR and tax price of 2.83·10
-6. Multiplying by
the proposed new annual expenditure yields the estimate of the household’s expected tax increase of 28.29 SFR.
(As we do not have information on households’ taxable income, the calculations are based on the net income
(before taxes) given by the CVM respondents. This procedure tends to rather overestimate households’ tax
burdens.17
Internal and external consistency in multivariate models
An indicator variable for voter behavior was defined as Yv = 1 if respondent’s vote was “yes”
and Yv = 0 if respondent’s vote was “no”. To appropriately compare explanatory patterns in
the actual referendum behavior with those in the CVM survey, the individual CVM responses
were coded as Yp = 1 (p for predicted) if respondent’s stated WTP was higher than the
expected tax increase due to the real referendum proposition and Yp = 0 otherwise. The
conditional models for the CVM and voting decisions were formulated as follows. Denoting
approval of the proposition by Y = 1, we have in the case of both actual and predicted
choices:
(1) Prob[Y = 1‰x ] = Prob[b b’x + e e > 0 ‰x ]
, where b  b is a vector of coefficients and x  is a vector of socio-economic characteristics of
individual i.
5 Sign expectation for income is ambiguous in these models because expected tax
increase is higher for the higher income groups (Table 6). Finally, a model for consistency of
behaviour was formulated as:
(2) Prob[Yp = Yv‰x] = Prob [g g’x + e  e > 0‰x ]
, where g  g is a vector of coefficients relating individuals’ characteristics to the probability of
consistent predicted and actual choices. The results of estimation are summarized in Table 7.
The logit model shows a consistent explanatory pattern for actual voting behavior (Model 1a),
                                               
5 Due to the taxation of income separate effects of income and tax price cannot be estimated. This contrasts e.g.
with analyses of school expenditure referenda in the US where the tax was raised on property (Rubinfeld 1977).18
but a limited explanatory power for the voting behavior predicted from CVM responses
(Model 1b). Variables for education, gender, urban residence, and farm occupation were all
significant in explaining voting choice, while only urban residence was a (weakly) significant
determinant of predicted voting behavior, a pattern that does not support internal consistency
of the predicted choices. When the same regressors were used to examine determinants of
external consistency of actual and predicted choices (Model 2) education tended to have
positive and age and farmer occupation negative effects, although coefficients were mostly
insignificant.
Summary and conclusions
External validity tests of hypothetical choices about public goods using laboratory
experiments is severely limited in terms of the type of goods being valued. CVM/voting
behaviour comparisons can thus provide information on otherwise intractable issues of CVM
validation. This study focussed on four issues: (i) comparison of mean and median stated
WTP in different voter groups (ii) relationships between qualitative response categories in
hypothetical and actual voter behavior, (iii) consistency of hypothetical WTP with implicit
actual WTP, and (iv) comparison of explanatory patterns in CVM choices with equivalent
regressions for actual voting choices. Results based on the sub-sample of respondents for
whom both CVM and voting choices were obtained can be summarized as follows.
(i) Although mean and median WTP differed among voter groups in the expected
ways, the magnitude of positive WTP bids alone did not.
(ii) There may be substantial proportions of high WTP bids, which are not backed by
actual voting decisions. ‘WTP non-response’ frequency was strongly biased towards actual19
disapproving voters. CVM bids classified as ‘protest zero’ in the survey could mostly be
identified as effectively ‘true zero’ based on the voter survey.
(iii) A strong upward bias of hypothetical values was found that can hardly be
attributed solely to any perceived differences is the valuation objects or uncertainty about
individual tax payments. The magnitude of positive WTP values apparently contained only
limited information about respondents’ preferences. It appears that many individuals did not
fully consider their budgets when making the CVM decision.
(iv) Compared with the actual voting choices, which showed a consistent explanatory
pattern in multivariate models, equivalent choices predicted from CVM responses showed
only very weak patterns. Similar external validity tests involving various public goods and
CVM surveys of various quality could reveal if this result is more pervasive or if it can be
attributed to failures of the present CVM survey.
Presently CVM researchers must process problematic WTP bids such as ‘non-
response’, potential ‘protest zero’, and ‘outliers’ largely on an ad hoc basis. Empirical studies
on the relative size of hypothetical·actual qualitative response categories in a sampled
population may provide an important empirical foundation for appropriately interpreting and
aggregating stated WTP for public goods. Together with calibration studies on hypothetical
vs. actual values (e.g., Fox et al.) such studies promise to yield increasingly reliable and thus
policy relevant stated preference methods for the valuation of public goods.
There are two major assumptions on which parts of the present comparison of
hypothetical and actual choices rely. First, it is assumed that the issues of the hypothetical and
real decisions were comparable. Although there may be little difference in issue from the
point of view of a relatively badly informed voter whose preferences may relate mainly to
appropriate levels of the expenditure, propositions clearly differed in detail of description
with the real good being better specified than the hypothetical good. Secondly, citizens were20
assumed to ‘know’ their tax increase due to the referendum to an adequate degree. While
voting patterns typically support this interpretation, it would be useful to simultaneously test it
in similar future studies by asking voters about their personal estimate of the expected tax
increase. We suggest that uncertainty due to both assumptions could thus be reduced in
carefully designed future comparisons of CVM and voting behavior.21
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1 Government in Switzerland knows three subsidiary levels, municipal, cantonal, and federal.
Referenda are held and taxes are raised at each of these. The canton of Zurich encompasses
171 municipalities, of which 25 belong to the Weinland region.26
Table 2. Description of the sampling process.










Citizens with right to vote 56027 17165
Contingent valuation survey
Initial addresses 1443 816
Valid household addresses 1096 100.0 709 100.0
Realized household interviews 661 60.3 523 73.8
Selected target persons 577 100.0 497 100.0
Realised personal interviews 404 70.0 412 82.9
Mail survey on voting behaviour
Initial addresses 404 412
Moved
1 or deceased 107 65
Potential respondents 297 100.0 347 100.0
No questionnaire returned 200 191
Questionnaires returned 97 156
Valid responses on voting behaviour
2 77 25.9 99 28.5
1 Person moved and new address is not known
2 This excludes the following categories from returned questionnaires: completed by wrong
person; item non-response; respondent uncertain about correctness of response.27
Table 3. Descriptives of CVM survey sample and voter survey sub-sample









Variable n mean n mean n mean / % n mean / %
Age (years) 404 47.1 77 52.8 412 46.5 99 46.7
Gender (1, 0) 404 0.47 77 0.51 412 0.48 99 0.47
Household income (1 to 6) 373 3.4 74 3.7 379 3.7 95 4.0
Education (1 to 7) 402 3.4 77 3.8 412 3.4 99 3.6
Landscape grade (1 to 6) 388 4.6 76 4.6 408 4.8 98 4.8
WTP non-response 46 11.4 %
(a) 12 15.6 % 
(a) 33 8.0 %
(b) 6 6.1 %
(b)
WTP protest zero bids 18 4.5 % 2 2.6 % 31 7.5 %
(c) 6 6.1 %
(c)
WTP true zero bids 22 5.5 % 3 3.9 % 44 10.7 %
 (d) 14 14.1 %
 (d)
WTP excl. protest zeros (SFR) 340 430.77
(e) 63 449.17
(e) 348 437.43
 (f) 87 496.34
 (f)
Note: Superscript letters indicate tested but non-significant differences between voter survey
respondents and non-respondents (c





2=1.25; (e): t=0.36; (f): t=1.61; (p=0.11).28
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of CVM responses of the different voter groups
Voter group Voting ‘yes’ Voting ‘no’ ‘Did not vote’
n 108 42 26
Number of positive bids 93 18 20
Number of WTP non-respondents 6
 a 8
 b 4
Number of (all) zero bids 7
 c 16
 d 2
Number of protest zero bids 2 5 0
WTP median 480 86 360
















Note: Different (equal) superscripts between columns indicate significant (non-sig.)
differences in c
2- and t-tests (see text).29
Table 5. Consistency of behaviour as CVM respondent and voter. (Only respondents with

















Approving voters 95 535 13.25 90 94.7
Disapproving voters 28 330 10.26 11 39.3
All active voters 123 488 12.57 101 82.130





1 categorical variable for household income
(intervals of 2000 SFR): 0, less than 2000; 2, less
than 4000; … 10, over 10,000 per month
?
EDU categorical variable for highest educational level
attained (1, obligatory school; …7, university)
+
AGE age of respondent in years –
GENDER binary variable for gender of respondent: 1, male;
0, female
?
TOWN binary variable for region of respondent: 1,
Winterthur; 0, Weinland
+
FARMER binary variable for profession: 1, farmer; 0, non-
farmer
–
LSGRADE categorical variable for grade/rating of the
Weinland landscape; 1, very bad; … 6, very good
+
1Reported incomes of SFR 0 were recoded to SFR 100 to avoid log(0).31
Table 7. Logit models for actual and predicted choices (Models 1a and 1b) and for
















Constant 2.665 0.494 -9.260 -1.154 9.629 1.343
5.400 8.026 7.168
log (INC) 0.114 0.285 0.929 1.444 -0.408 -0.717
0.402 0.643 0.568
log (EDU) 1.659 2.187* 0.529 0.589 0.558 0.767
0.758 0.899 0.728
log (AGE) -0.652 -1.138 0.310 0.508 -1.065 -1.659(*)
0.573 0.610 0.642
GENDER -1.684 -2.820** -0.574 -0.946 -0.342 -0.626
0.597 0.607 0.546
TOWN 1.220 2.006* 1.339 1.873(*) 0.184 0.332
0.608 0.715 0.555
FARMER -3.220 -2.272* 0.679 0.513 -2.880 -2.271*
1.418 1.323 1.268
LSGRADE -2.021 -1.171 -0.111 -0.061 -1.756 -1.008
1.725 1.828 1.742
Observations 123 123 123




Notes: (i) Significance levels: (*): p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01; (ii) SE: standard error32
Appendix:
Structure of the voter survey questionnaire.





















How did you vote on
these issues?
Please mark the correct
box
Question 2
(…) How certain are
you about your response
to question 1?












… … … … … … ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿